Terrorism in Greece. November 17

1.8 Terrorism in Greece. November 17

(also known as 17N or N17) was a Marxist Greek terrorist organisation listed in U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Its full name is Revolutionary Organization 17 November (Greek: Επαναστατική Οργάνωση 17 Νοέμβρη, Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri).

N17 had perpetrated a series of attacks from 1975. Until 2002 no member of the group had been identified or arrested. The group is named after the November 17, 1973 uprising by students at the Athens Polytechnic university against the military junta, in which twenty students were killed. Since the military junta was backed by the United States as part of that country's anti-Communist efforts, most of the group's attacks have been directed at American targets.

The group's first attack was in December 1975, when the CIA's Athens station chief was shot. The group have committed further assassinations, often using a .45 caliber handgun, and around fifty other attacks. Initial attacks were aimed at American and Greek officials but the range of operations was expanded in the 1980s and 1990s to include bombings and EU targets. The group is also opposed to Turkey and NATO.

The group wanted to get rid of U.S. bases in Greece, to remove the Turkish military from Cyprus, and to sever Greece's ties to NATO and the European Union.

In June 2000, the group killed Stephen Saunders, a British Defense Attachй. His wife went on television urging the Greek people to help apprehend his killers.

Following a failed operation on June 29, 2002 the Greek authorities captured an injured suspect, Savvas Xiros. His interrogation led to the discovery of two safe houses and to the arrest of a further six suspects, including two brothers of Savvas. A 58 year old professor, Alexandros Giotopoulos, was identified as the group leader and was arrested on July 17 on the island of Lipsi. On September 5, Dimitris Koufodinas—identified as the group's chief of operations—surrendered to the authorities. In all, nineteen individuals were charged with some 2,500 offences relating to November 17's activities. Because of the 20-year statute of limitations, murders before 1984 were not tried by the court.

The trial of the terrorist suspects commenced in Athens on March 3, 2003. On December 8, fifteen of the accused, including Giotopoulos and Koufodinas, were found guilty; another four were acquitted for lack of evidence. The convicted members were sentenced on December 17, with Giotopoulous sentenced to 21 life terms—the heaviest sentence in modern Greek legal history. Koufodinas received 13 life terms. The prosecutor has proposed that Christodoulos Xeros receive 10 life terms; Savvas Xeros six; Vassilitis Tzortzatos four; Iraklis Kostaris one. Lesser sentences are proposed for the remaining nine, in the light of extenuating circumstances.

Defense lawyers of the defendants as well as several civil rights groups has stressed the highly irregular character of the trial. The trial was conducted by a special court with closed doors and the use of television cameras was prohibited. People sympathetic to their causes believe that this was so that it would be easier to condemn all the accused despite very little non-circumstantial evidence. Many of the accused, notably Alexandros Giotopoulos, denied their participation until the end of the year long trial. According to Giotopoulos, he was framed so that the image of a terrorist organization led by a clear leader could be presented. The accused that did admit participation to the group, notably Dimitris Koufondinas who took "full political responsibility for all of the group actions", presented a picture of a loose horizontally organized structure with small cells and decisions taken by discussion and consensus.

Under Greek law, one life term is equal to a 25-year term and a convict may apply for parole after 16 years. If sentenced to more than one life term, he or she must serve at least 20 years before being eligible for parole. Other sentences will run concurrently, with 25-year terms being the maximum and with parole possible after three-fifths of this term are served.

On September 17, 2004, the imprisoned started a hunger strike protesting the especially harsh conditions of their imprisonment and their sensory isolation. According to their statements, "bourgeois democracy" takes revenge on them by enclosing them in "a prison witin a prison."

1.9 Counter-terrorism

Past International Action

Although terrorism has long been a central issue on the UN agenda, commanding an increasingly large focus ever since the September 11th attacks and the subsequent military actions undertaken in the Middle East and Central Asia, it has remained surprisingly silent on the topic of terrorism in Europe. Most of the following resolutions deal with terrorism in general, or with Islamic extremists, not with any particular threats within the European Union; that domain remains to be covered: Resolution 49/60 (1994), Resolution 1269 (1999), and Resolution 1373 (2001).

Proposed Solutions

Clearly, this issue is both sensitive and complex. The difficulty in dealing with it directly stems from the illusive nature of the main actors. No one disputes that terrorists should be punished and deterred, but the challenge lies in identifying degrees of terrorist actions and agreeing on the best way to react. As the old cliché goes, one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter.

Unlike the United States, members of the European Union have not take a stance of no negotiation with terrorists. Previously, terrorists have been successful in negotiating with European nations, thereby granting a degree of validity to their methods. For instance, on 19 January 1975, when 10 people were taken hostage in the Orly airport in France by Arab terrorists, French authorities provided the group with an airplane to fly to Iraq in exchange for the release of the hostages. Similarly, on 27 January of the same year, the June the Second Movement took Peter Lorenz, a German politician, hostage until five terrorists were released from jail and allowed to return to Yemen. In April, 12 hostages were taken in Sweden in exchange for the release of members of terrorists from the Baader-Meinhof gang. It does not seem that this approach is viable in the long-run. Negotiation is extremely dangerous and threatens the future effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures. It shows weakness on the part of the EU and encourages groups to gain recognition of their desires through violence. So, one way of discouraging future attacks is to disprove their political efficacy. The military resources of Europol, of NATO, of the UN, of the sovereign nations of the EU should not go to waste. European states can and should fight back.

The problem with this approach is that it does not distinguish between degrees of action and is not overly sympathetic. Its proponents run the risk of being labeled hypocrites, of seeming terrorist-like themselves, and of alienating moderating forces.

Then there are those who believe that, in the vein of Resolution 1373, the solution to terrorism is financial. Simply put, terrorists need assets to fund their actions. Without money, they will be unable to purchase equipment, organize, or communicate, and consequently, unable to perpetrate any cohesive and effective attacks. Nations should freeze the funds of suspected terrorists and severely punish anyone who is suspected of aiding terrorist organizations.

Unfortunately, as easy and straightforward as this approach sounds, it is extremely problematic. First of all, how do you identify whose assets to freeze? What relationship or suspicion is enough to cut off funds from an individual? And perhaps, more to the point, what of prominent corporations and organizations? If, for instance, some major international bank is suspected of financing terrorists, it cannot effectively be shut down or punished. Sometimes, freezing assets of wealthy individuals or entities can be extremely hurtful to a state's economy and can provoke bitter public criticism that may not seem to be worth the hassle. Finally, it is extremely hard to trace all sources of terrorist funding.

There is also the camp of believers who view the issue of terrorism in a judicial light. The fact that groups commit illegal actions does not mean that states should violate any international norms of behavior in dealing with them. Violence and coercion are not the way to go. Rather, terrorists should be discouraged from acting through strict, predictable, and unrelenting laws.

Codes of conduct and punishments should be such that individuals will find it in their best interests to stay away from any suspected terrorist activity. Stricter punishment, not force, should be the main deterrent. Terrorists who are caught should be tried fairly and openly, and sentenced accordingly. Then there can be no international censure, since no force has been used, and individuals are brought to justice morally and legally.

Once again, this optimistic view is not completely in touch with reality. First is the issue of time delay. Trials can take an extremely long time to reach a final verdict, in the meantime offering a window of opportunity for further terrorist actions. Then, the argument has been made repeatedly that certain religious beliefs hold death as a martyr as holy and noble; legal sentences do not do anything to discourage individuals who hold these beliefs from engaging in terrorist activities. Something more tangible, such as military strength or financial insolvency (i.e. actions that will physically prevent attacks from being carried out), should be the policy, since a moral or legal threat is unlikely to be effective.

One of the most important steps that can be taken in fighting terrorism is the recognition that it does not exist in a vacuum. Terrorist activity has links to issues of transnational crime, immigration, the drug trade, and numerous other endeavors. As the Italian government states, "The fight against international terrorism must be accompanied by effective measures to combat transnational crime and illegal immigration, with the reinforcement of EUROPOL, and by constant and coordinated control of external borders; by laying down common rules on asylum; by stepping up cooperation arrangements with the countries of origin or transit of the migration flows; and by improving cooperation between Member States on matters relating to visas."

No measure against terrorism will be effective if it does not also take into consideration the issues that are closely related to terrorist action.

Bloc Positions

There really are no clear-cut bloc positions on this issue. Basically, every member of the European Union opposes terrorism in essence and would like to see something done to combat it. No one would like to be caught voting against an anti-terrorism measure. However, there are some degrees of variation within this general consensus. For instance, while Great Britain is much more likely to agree to a stringent, more military and punitive measure, France may be more likely to opt for a more accommodating solution. In the long run, though, every country has an interest in coming up with an effective solution and all are likely to work together to come up with a compromise measure that will protect them all from terrorist attacks. Every member of the EU is threatened and so every member will work to implement an effective resolution. Where the tension will come in is in the exact strictness and direction the proposal will take.

Conclusion

The number of European deaths from terror attacks over the last few decades has remained relatively constant. It's our perception of the threat that's changed.

Attacks against 'soft' civilian targets are not new, we can just recall the IRA pub bombings in the 1960s. The concern is that terrorists now seem to be more interested in these targets - it's very difficult to protect every pub, or every train, in the country.

Then there's the increased threat of Islamic terrorism. The September 11 attacks also ushered in a new era, where the West learned the devastating potential of terrorists prepared to take their own lives. And of course it's possible that such groups have shared, or will share, information and expertise with indigenous organisations and, thus, be continuously expanding.

On the other hand many organisations and particular individuals do their best to challenge the threat and try to combat it.

Political means. Although problematic, peace negotiations in Northern Ireland have seen a halt to the spate of IRA bombings in the 1970s and 80s. Spain's approach to ETA has been uncompromising. Part of the strategy has been to ban ETA’s alleged political wing, Batasuna. Anti-terrorist laws have been hardened with mandatory life sentences for anyone convicted of serious terrorist offences.

Legal means. After 25 years of attacks in Greece, November 17 leaders Alexandros Giotopoulos and Dimitris Koufodinas were among 15 sentenced to life in December 2003.

Impact of September 11. Since the New York attacks, intelligence monitoring of Islamic groups has been stepped up, as has co-operation between European agencies. In Britain in particular controversial legislation has been passed giving the police greater powers against terrorist suspects.

Practical means. September 11 has made Europe more twitchy and a greater emphasis has been placed on protecting high-profile targets. In Britain, this has included a mock gas attack on a tube station and the stepping up of the 'ring of steel' security monitoring around London's financial centre.

It is very hard to decide whether terrorism can be unstoppable. But the problem is very acute and gets a lot of attention. Hopefully by uniting the efforts of the governments and its secret police services, NGOs and each and every one of us this terror is going to stop one day.

Bibliography

1 Britain in Close-UP

2 BBC In Depth Spain/Northern Ireland

3 General European Council Information. http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm

4 Center for Defense Information. www.cdi.org

5 The European Terrorism Review: July 2002.

6 www.nnjv.btinternet.co.uk/ETR_july2002.htm

7 The Economist. www.economist.com

8 www.rferl.org

9 Nexus magazine http://www.nexusmagazine.com/articles/hiddenterror.html

10 http://www.ehu.es/cpvweb/paginas/euskobarometro.html

11 www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/statements.htm

12 the Guardian Special Report Northern Ireland

13 Islamic terrorism in europe http://www.lbouza.net/INTERNAC/econ25.htm

14 http://free.freespeech.org/askatasuna/docs/zulo.htm

15 CNN.com specials