3. Agriculture machinery
According to various resources, an immediate demand to replenish the physically depreciated farm and processing equipment in Ukraine is estimated at $5-10 billion, with an annual supply of $1-2 billion worth of farm equipment.
Experts estimate the current level of physical depreciation of agricultural machinery and equipment at 70-80 percent, compared to 55-60 percent in 1999. Approximately 40 percent of tractors are 15-25 years old. The need to replace basic farm machinery is becoming critical.
There are about 40 manufacturers of agricultural machinery in Ukraine, which still supply a significant part of Ukraine agricultural machinery, in particular, ploughs, harrows, cultivators, seeders and sprayers. Production facilities at most agricultural machinery plants are currently being utilized at levels ranging from 15 to 30 percent. The price of domestically produced agricultural machinery is not cheap, because of inefficient and outdated manufacturing technologies. All this makes local machinery less attractive for agricultural companies.
Western European firms actively operate in the Ukrainian market. They understand that despite the obstacles to doing business in Ukraine, the potential for hard currency agribusiness exports is great. U.S. agricultural machinery has a good reputation in Ukraine. The list of U.S. manufacturers includes AGCO Corporation, Massey Ferguson, John Deere, Caterpillar, and Case/New Holland. They offer a full range of equipment and parts, including spare parts, for cultivating, growing, harvesting and transporting, as well as equipment for livestock production. While U.S. machinery is well represented in Ukraine, there are still good opportunities for U.S. companies to enter the Ukrainian agricultural machinery market. Existing critical demand for reconditioned (used) machinery is worth mentioning as well.
4. Problems of this sector of economy
The production of grain and oilseed crops is dominated by large agricultural enterprises that were established when Ukraine’s agricultural sector was restructured in April, 2000. (In contrast, nearly 90 percent of the country's vegetables and virtually all of the potatoes are grown on private household plots.) State and collective farms were dismantled and farm property was divided among the farm workers in the form of land shares. Most new shareholders leased their land back to newly-formed private agricultural associations, under the leadership of a director who was frequently, but not always, the manager of the former State farm. Consolidation of small farms into larger and more viable enterprises has been the prevailing trend, similar to what took place in Russia several years earlier. (For a brief discussion of Ukraine’s agricultural restructuring, see June 2001 report.) The conversion to a more market-oriented environment has progressed relatively well according to most observers. Many farms are succeeding, under shrewd leadership, in spite of fluctuating grain prices and constraints on the availability of credit. The transition of Ukraine's agricultural sector from a command economy to a more market-oriented system has introduced the element of fiscal responsibility, and farm managers are striving to make their enterprises as efficient as possible. Decisions on crop selection, fertilizer application, harvest method, grain storage, and all other aspects of farm management are made with an eye toward boosting farm profit. Ukraine agriculture is going through a winnowing process whereby unprofitable, usually smaller farms will either collapse or join more successful farms.
Most farms are able to receive credit, but interest rates and collateral demands are high. Since many farms are already heavily in debt to banks or suppliers of fertilizer and plant-protection chemicals, and since agricultural loans are not guaranteed by the government, banks are largely unwilling to make long-term loans. Most credit is extended in the form of seasonal loans (six to ten months) used almost exclusively for the purchase of fertilizer and plant protection chemicals. Commercial interest rates typically range from 25 to 30 percent. The State provides assistance to farms by paying 50 percent of the interest on agricultural loans. Banks typically require 200 to 300 percent collateral, depending on the farm’s credit history and the risk level. Future crop usually serves as collateral, but collateral can also be offered in the form of livestock, farm machinery, or the personal property of the farm director. Under current legislation, land cannot be used as collateral. Farms' difficulty in obtaining anything other than short-term, high-interest loans places severe constraints on their ability to invest in long-term capital improvements, such as agricultural machinery or storage facilities. Using land as collateral would enable farms to receive longer-term loans, but many farm directors remain leery of the Ukrainian banking system – which is not yet as stable as in Russia – and are reluctant to risk losing their land in default. Furthermore, many agricultural enterprises are comprised of hundreds of shareholders, whose permission would need to be obtained before the farm director could use the land as collateral.
In many cases, the best option is for a farm to attract an investor who can provide market expertise, operating capital, and collateral to enable the farm to secure loans. The potential “down side” of investor arrangements, from the farmer's perspective, is that farm directors to some extent lose control of farm operations. Often the investment company, or “holding company,” insists on maintaining control over every aspect of production and essentially takes over the farm, equipment, and land. Farms are forced to enter into extended leases of five to ten years, sometimes longer, because they depend heavily on cash from the holding company.
The consensus of most observers is that already-successful farms will continue to expand as shareholders pull out of failing farms and lease their plots to stronger ones. Clearly, many farms will not survive the transition to a market economy, and high-risk farms with few liquid assets, heavy debt, bad credit history, and poor management will collapse.
The loss of State subsidies following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 increased feed and production costs and reduced profitability for livestock enterprises. As prices for meat products increased, consumer demand declined, thus establishing a downward spiral that continued throughout the decade. Livestock inventories, and demand for forage, continued to shrink. The increasing inability of large agricultural enterprises (i.e., former State and collective farms) to maintain livestock operations, due largely to inefficient management and farms' inability to ensure sufficient feed supplied, resulted in increased dependence on private producers and household farms to satisfy demand for beef and pork. Furthermore, the involvement of investor groups (holding companies) in agricultural production has had an impact on livestock numbers. Many farms who entered agreements with investment firms killed off their herds because livestock is not quickly profitable and not as attractive to investors. Although the freefall in livestock inventories has slowed since 2000, a rapid recovery in beef production is unlikely. Cattle inventories are increasing on private household farms, which typically have two to three head of cattle per farm, but large industrial farms are shifting away from cattle and toward crop production and total cattle inventories continue to decrease.
5. Investment in agriculture
Investment in agriculture land in Ukraine is conducted under farmland lease agreements. Lease contracts are closed directly with pai-holders for different periods averaging at 10 years and going up to 49 years. Farmland pai lease contracts enable contractors to consolidate large fields of 50-200 hectares located close to each other for the ease of crop rotation planning, cultivation and harvesting.
Ukraine’s agricultural land cannot be purchased, but lease agreements for agricultural land enable as much freedom for performing farming operations as ownership while also providing a primary right of purchase in case of the agricultural land sale moratorium lift and given that pai holders would be willing to sell off their property.
Cost of investment in Ukraine’s farmlands is the lowest in Europe while it provides the highest return potential given the high soil fertility and unrealized agri-ecological potential of Ukraine’s soils. The cost of investment is composed of the lease rights acquisition cost, annual lease fees and annual cultivation (actual farming operation) costs.
Land lease rights acquisition cost in 2009 has ranged from USD 120 to USD 300 per hectare depending of the region and soil quality. Lease rights are normally acquired through the transfer of corporate rights from the current lease holding company to the new owners. Lease rights can also be transferred through re-registration of land lease agreements.
Annual land lease fees are legally fixed at a minimum 3% of the land plot value level but may vary from region to region. Lease fees in 2009 have ranged from USD 25 to USD 45 per hectare.
Agricultural land lease agreements carry a legal obligation of land cultivation which inevitably requires a lessee to perform actual farming activities. Since agricultural equipment lease is not very common in Ukraine, most farms invest in tractors, tillage equipment, seeding equipment, harvesters, etc. Capital investment into agricultural equipment in Ukraine may vary from USD 350 (locally produced equipment or mixed) to USD 800 (high-end Western equipment) per hectare.
Calculated per annum with fuel, spare parts, seeds, fertilizers, crop protection, labor costs, etc. included, annual cultivation cost from USD 200 per hectare using organic farming methods up to USD 500 per hectare with conventional/chemical farming. Organic farming, as opposed to intensive conventional farming, provides a better investment opportunity in Ukraine due to high natural fertility level in the soils. In most of the cases, there are no yield losses when growing organically in Ukraine compared to what most of the Western European farms experience during the transition period.
Optimal investment cost in Ukraine’s agricultural land in 2009 is one of the lowest at USD 600-800 per hectare compared to Americas’ (USA and Argentina) USD 4,000+, and Western European level of USD 12,000+. At the same time, the current harvest yields in Ukraine suggest that the agro-ecological potential of 6.2 metric tons per hectare can be easily obtained under proper farm management and with the use of optimal organic technologies. Besides, the land lease price is expected to double in 2010.
Ukraine’s soil quality is subject to bonitet valuation system. Most of Ukraine’s soils boast a bonitet above 40. Chernozem (black soil types) have a bonitet of 70-80 and more. Soil fertility is a complex quality of soils and not limited by bonitet. Land valuation in Ukraine has no standardized system and in most of the cases is based on the yeilds history for particular farms or individual fields.
Soil quality tests are easy to obtain in Ukraine and cost USD 200-450 per measured field (50-200 hectares). Such tests often include detailed recommendations for further soil treatment making it very easy to draw cultivation and fertilization plans per each individual field.
Farm management, on the other hand, is a more complex issue. Many Ukrainian farms lack new equipment or sufficient knowledge of modern farming technologies and sustainable farming methods.
An optimal size of an individual farm in Ukraine is 5,000 to maximum 10,000 hectares. The farm volume is considered optimal when any commercial crop can be harvested and sold at the minimum export volume of 3,000-5,000 metric tons.
Harvest storage is a critical consideration for operational independence and financial stability of a farm not only in UKraine. A capital investment of USD 120-150 per metric ton of storage should be considered to secure long-term performance of a farm.
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