Social Protection ( US$ 0.56 million)

4. Social Protection ( US$ 0.56 million)

(i) Assistance in the design of a program of social assistance which meets the needs of poor families that do not qualify under any existing program;

(ii) Facilitating the establishment of private pension schemes.

5. Resource mobilization and public information

( US$ 1.43 million)

(i) A program aimed at improving the revenue collection performance of the Customs Department through training, revision of procedures and controls, and anti-fraud measures;

(ii) A public information/education program on economic reforms, including mass media campaigns, round-tables/seminars on key issues, and the design of an education program focusing on skills in high demand in market economics

Implementing Agency Zaal Japaridze, Head of PIU, 12 Kazbegi Ave.

Phone: (99532) 950865

Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations

42, Kazbegi Ave.

Phone: (99532) 225186 / (99532) 389652

 

TRANSPORT REHABILITATION

Project Objective 1. To support policy reform in the transport sectoral and restructure its institutions to operate in a market economy.

2. To repair and maintain some of the most critical elements of the transport system.

Project Description (1) Institution Building Component (US$ 4.9 million):

(i) advice and support to teams preparing sector reforms;

(ii) technical assistance for the formulation of technical and legal framework necessary to the restructuring,

commercialization and privatization of sector entities;

(iii) managerial assistance for public and private transport enterprises;

(iv) a training program to update transport technical staff of the private and public sectors;

(v) project management.

(2) Investment Component ( US$ 13.2million )

(i) road maintenance program, including selected equipment and spares for road maintenance as well as emergency repairs and the necessary imported road building materials;

(ii) a railway sub-component, including bridge repairs and the required structural steel, track materials (ties, rails and fastenings), spares for locomotives, and communications and selected signaling equipment

 

Implementing Agency Gia Tsagareli, Head of PIU, 12 Kazbegi Ave.

Phone: (99532) 986385

Fax: (99532) 990461

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAC)

Project Objective: The main objective is to consolidate stabilization, foster a strong and sustained growth recovery and reduce poverty.

The reform program aims at:

(a)   maintaining a tight monetary program supported by an improving fiscal position;

(b)  streamlining the Government sector and improving efficiency of public spending;

(c)   inducing a rapid adjustment of the productive sector to new market signals.

The other objectives are;

(i)   provide budgetary support to maintain the level of critical public expenditures;

(ii)  provide foreign exchange for the purchase of critical imports;

(iii) provide a framework for financial assistance from other donor agencies.

Project

Description: 1. Maintaining a Tight Monetary Policy:

-   reduce inflation to 20-25 percent in 1996 and strengthen the international position of NBG;

-   increase the range of monetary instruments and enhance the capacity of the NBG to achieve monetary objectives.

2. Improving the Fiscal System:

-   ensure sustainability of stabilization;

-   increase tax revenue to 6.7 percent of GDP in 1996;

-   reach a revenue to expenditure ration of 70 percent in 1996 and maintain budget deficit at 3-4 percent of GDP in 1996.

3. Streamlining of the Government Sector and Improving the Efficiency of Public Spending:

-   to maintain critical public function within the framework of a tight expenditure program (expenditure maintained at about 13 percent of GDP in 1996);

-   reforming government pay and employment;

-   reforming the provision and financing of social services reforming social insurance and social protection;

-   eliminating energy subsidies;

4. Fostering Adjustment of the Productive Sector:

-   accelerating privatization;

-   restructuring the financial sector;

-   fostering export growth.

Disbursement: US$ 29.88 million

The disbursement of the loan is linked to agreed targets specified for each tranche release – to be met by the Georgian Government in implementing its structural reform program.

SECOND STRUCRUTAL ADJUSTMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CREDIT (SATAC II)

Project Description: The Government’s structural reform program outline in the Letter of development Policy was presented with the Second Adjustment Credit (SACII), $60 million (which closed in December 1998). To facilitate the timely implementation of structural reforms, the Government requested a program of technical assistance to support the design and implementation of reform measures in the key areas. The institutional capacity of the Government to implement structural reform measures has been successfully strengthened under the Institutional Building Credit (IBC) and the Structural Adjustment Technical Assistance Credit (SATAC). Lessons learned from these two technical assistance projects were incorporated in the design of SATAC II.

 

The Core objective of SATAC II is to enhance the capacity of the Georgian Government to implement the structural reform program supported by SAC II.

The technical assistance is divided into seven broad categories:

·     judicial reform and anti-corruption initiative;

·     financial sector;

·     energy sector reforms;

·     social protection

·     health

·     resource mobilization

·     public information

5.1.4     The World Bank and IMF Cooperation in Georgia

The World Bank and IMF Partnership in Georgia’s Development Strategy

1.          The IMF has taken the lead in assisting Georgia in enhancing macroeconomic stability. In this regard, the Fund has encouraged the authorities to pursue a prudent fiscal policy, including by increasing tax revenues and reducing domestic expenditure arrears. The IMF Board approved a new three-year program under the Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in January 2001. The first and the second reviews under the PRGF were completed in October 2001 and July 2002, respectively. Implementation of the 2002 macroeconomic program was broadly on track. Quantita­tive criteria and indicative targets were met, except for those on domestic arrears, fuel and excise tax collection and reserve money. At 2 percent of GDP, the fiscal deficit was slightly higher than programmed because of shortfalls in external financing, and revenue collection improved only slightly from 14.3 percent of GDP to 14.4 percent over the period. An IMF mission which visited Georgia in July 2003 to discuss completion of the postponed third review found that the fiscal pressures that emerged in early 2003 had continued, with tax revenue falling short of budget targets, and an accumulation of substantial new budget arrears. The IMF thus saw the need inter alia to introduce some tax reform measures, adjust electricity tariffs and revise the 2003 budget to close the fiscal gap. The authorities achieved the first two but were unable to secure parliamentary approval of a revised budget. The current PRGF will expire in the next several months and the IMF will soon be initiating discussions to assess prospects for a possible new three-year program to support Georgia’s EDPRP.

2.          The World Bank has taken the lead in the policy dialogue on structural issues, focusing on: (i) strengthening public expenditure management; (ii) deepening and diversifying sources of growth, (iii) protecting the environment; and (iv) reducing poverty. The table on page 53 summarizes the division of responsibility between the two institu­tions. In a number of areas – for example the social sectors, rural development, environment, and infrastructure – the Bank takes the lead in the dialogue and there is no cross conditionality with the IMF-supported program. The Bank is also leading the dialogue on private sector reform, and Bank analysis serves as inputs into the Fund program. In other areas – energy, the financial sector, public expenditure management, and revenue and customs – both institutions work together. Finally, in areas like monetary policy the IMF takes the lead with little Bank involvement.

Areas in which the World Bank leads and there is no direct IMF involvement